Abstract-Why have some countries done so much better than others over the recent past? This paper sheds light on this issue by providing a decomposition of the change in the distribution of output per worker across countries over the period . We find that most of the change in shape of the world distribution of income can be accounted for by a very substantial increase in the social returns to capital accumulation. In contrast, we do not find significant effects coming through changes in the effect of initial conditions or through increases in the importance of education.
I. Introduction
O VER the period 1960 to 1998, the shape of the distribution of output per worker (and output per capita) across countries has changed considerably. As discussed in Quah (1997) and Jones (1997) among others, in 1960 this distribution was clearly unimodal and close to log normal. Over time, however, the middle of the distribution hollowed out quite substantially, as mass moved away from the mean of the distribution and the interquartile range increased. This process-which is closely related to what Quah named the twin-peaks phenomenon-is the object of study of this paper. 1,2 The approach we adopt is to decompose the observed changes in the world distribution of output per worker over the period 1960-1998 into three main components: (i) changes in the distribution of driving forces that affect growth across countries, (ii) changes in the importance of these driving forces, and (iii) changes in the distribution of residual or unobservable factors affecting growth. 3 We believe that providing such a decomposition will help orient research on the international distribution of income in the same manner that within-country decompositions of wage distributions have helped direct recent research in labor economics.
The first key observation from our investigation is that the hollowing out of the middle of the output-per-worker distribution began around 1978, the process essentially not being apparent before that year. This leads us to pose the question: What differences between the periods 1960-1978 and 1978-1998 can account for the observed changes in the shape of the world distribution of output per worker? The main finding of the paper is that most of the change can be accounted for by changes in the importance of two factors associated with capital deepening: increases in the effects on a country's output per worker of the rate of investment in physical capital (or the savings rate) and of the rate of population growth. Indeed, our estimates indicate that coefficients associated with these factors in standard growth regressions increased threefold from 1960 to 1998. In contrast, we do not find that changes in the cross-country distribution of investment rates, rates of labor force growth, school enrollment rates, or residual factors played much of a role. Similarly, we do not find any significant effects coming through nonlinear convergence mechanisms, institutions, or increased importance of schooling.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, we document changes in the distribution of output per worker between 1960 and 1998. In section III, we present our method of decomposing changes in the distribution of output per worker into changes due to observable and unobservable factors. Section IV focuses on the stability of the growth process over the period, because that is a necessary step prior to implementing the decomposition. In section V, we implement the decomposition. Our main finding is that the changes in importance of two factors-the investment rate and labor force growth-can account for most of the change in the shape of the distribution. Finally, in section VI we discuss a set of issues that help refine the set of possible explanations that lay behind this process.
II. Changes in the Distribution, 1960-1998
This section describes the changes in the distribution of output per worker. We confine our attention to the set of countries available in Penn World Table 6 .0 over the period 1960 to 1998, excluding countries in sub-Saharan Africa. We refer to our sample as the non-sub-Saharan-African (NSSA) countries. In an earlier version of this paper (Beaudry, Collard, & Green, 2002) , we demonstrated that the results and conclusions we present here are also present in the full set of countries. However, war and drought led to particularly poor output per worker values for sub-Saharan Africa in the 1970s and 1980s. We feel it is more powerful to show that our results hold even controlling for what happened in those countries (that is, that our results are not driven by the extreme events in those countries and years). The simplest approach to this is to drop the sub-Saharan African countries from the analysis. The reader is referred to for confirmation that this approach does not alter our conclusions. The list of countries composing our sample is given in the appendix section 2. 4, 5 The measure of output used is real GDP evaluated at constant world prices, 6 and the denominator in our outputper-worker measure is the number of individuals aged between 15 and 64. 7 Figure 1 reports the distribution of (log) output per worker across the set of NSSA countries in 1960 and 1998. The plotted distributions are kernel density estimates based on a Gaussian kernel. 8 Both distributions are expressed as deviations from the given year's mean, in order to emphasize changes in the shape of the distribution. The actual distribution shifted substantially to the right from 1960 to 1998. In fact, the average output per worker increased by 134% between 1960 and 1998 for this set of 75 countries, implying an average annualized rate of growth of 2.27%. Figure 1 also reports the points in the distribution associated with the interquartile ranges in 1960 and 1998. 9 The distributions in figure 1 display several prominent features. First, the shape of the distribution changed considerably from 1960 to 1998. In particular, the distribution of 1960 (log) output per worker was unimodal and, apart from thick tails, close to normal. As time passed, mass has shifted away from the center toward two new modes, leading to a bimodal distribution in the late nineties. This observation corresponds to the so-called twin-peaks phenomenon documented in Quah (1993) and Jones (1997) . More recently Kremer, Onatski, and Stock (2001) questioned the robustness of characterizing the latter distribution as having twin peaks. In response to this controversy, we focus on two features of the data which provide a more robust description of how the distribution changed over the period 1960 to 1998: the interquartile range and the mass near the middle of the distribution. 4 We included in our sample all countries that did not have missing data for more than two years between 1960 and 1998. This gave us a sample of 75 countries, with 69 countries having no missing data, and 6 countries with at most two years of missing data. For these 6 countries, the missing data were linearly interpolated. All our results are robust to excluding these 6 countries from the sample.
5 See the appendix for greater details on the data. 6 Several measures of real GDP are given in the Penn World Tables. Our analysis is robust to the use of these different measures.
7 It would be preferable to have a more precise measure of the number of workers, but this is not available for a sufficiently wide set of countries. For OECD countries, we have examined the potential biases induced by not taking into account differences across countries in participation rates. We found that using a direct measure of the number of workers for OECD countries provides even stronger evidence in favor of the main claim of the paper than that found using population data (see . 8 We use a bandwidth parameter given by h ϭ 1.0592N Ϫ1/5 , where is the standard deviation of the data and N is the number of observations. 9 The points of the interquartile range are calculated from the raw data and not from the kernel estimates of the density function. Figure 1 reveals that the change in the distribution took the form of a substantial widening of the interquartile range. We document this movement, along with movements in other quantile ranges, in table 1. This table shows a clear expansion in the interquartile range (26.5%) and the fact that this expansion is evident over other ranges, such as the 20-80, 30-70, and 40-60 percentile differences. However, the 5-95 percentile difference declined over the same period, indicating there was actually inward movement in the tails at the same time as the interquartile range expanded. 10 Because a widening of an interquartile range can arise in many different forms, it is useful to look at how the fraction of countries lying within a given window around the mean changed over time. For example, we can take a window of Ϯ50% (that is, 0.5 log point) around the mean and examine the fraction of countries within that band in 1960 versus 1998. 11 Table 2 reports these numbers.
In 1960, 49% of countries fell into the Ϯ0.5-log-point window, whereas in 1998 only 39% of countries fell within the same window. The phenomenon is also apparent if we examine a window of Ϯ0.7 log point around the mean: the mass of countries lying within this band was 61% in 1960 and only 49% in 1998. These numbers-when taken together with the percentile differences-indicate a widening that has taken place around the interquartile range and corresponds to a hollowing out of the middle of the distribution with mass moving toward two modes, but without a fattening of the tails.
The second issue we want to examine is the timing of this hollowing-out process. Panels A and B of figure 2 plot, respectively, percentile differences and mass-around-themean statistics for the entire period 1960 to 1998. From panel A, one can see that the 20-80 percentile difference, the interquartile range, and the 30-70 percentile differences were all rather stable through the sixties and much of the seventies but that somewhere around 1978 (which is marked by the vertical dashed line in the figures), all three began to rise sharply. The interquartile range, for example, actually declined by approximately 11% from 1960 to 1978 but increased by almost 40% between 1978 and 1998. For easy reference, table 1 reports the actual levels of these and other percentile ranges for the years 1960, 1978, and 1998 . Thus, figure 2 suggests that the particular widening of the distribution observed in figure 1 has arisen only since 1978. This conclusion is reinforced in the mass-around-the-mean plots in panel B, in which 1978 stands out more sharply as the breakpoint. 12
III. A Framework for Decomposing Changes in the Cross-Country Distribution of Output per Worker
The object of this section is to present a simple framework for assessing the importance of different factors in explaining the observed changes in the world distribution of output per worker. Our strategy is to provide a (quite standard) decomposition of the changes in the distribution. 13 To this end, we start with the identity given
whereby a country's log level of output per worker in 1998, denoted y i 98 is expressed as the log level of output in 1960 ( y i 60 ) plus the sum of its growth rate between 1960 and 1978 (G i 60-78 ) and its growth rate between 1978 and 1998 (G i 78-98 ). The decision to split the growth process at 1978 is based on our discussion in the previous section suggesting 1978 as the date after which the twin-peaks phenomenon started to emerge.
In equation (1), g i j is the annual rate of growth of output in country i over the sample period j ϭ {60-78, 78-98}. The growth rates for each of the subperiods can then be expressed, as in the standard growth regression literature, as the sum of a force of convergence related to initial levels of income per worker plus the effects of a set of countryspecific variables X i which potentially explain growth:
10 Accordingly, the variance of the distribution only increased marginally over the period.
11 This amounts to computing the mass of countries lying within the band [ y t Ϫ ⌬; y t ϩ ⌬], where ⌬ determines the width of the window. 12 It should be noted that the twin-peaks phenomenon is even more pronounced when we look at output per capita rather than output per worker. However, the distribution of output per capita differs from that of output per worker in that it shows widening not only in the middle of the distribution but also in the tails. Consumption per capita presents a similar pattern, but with less bimodality. (Graphs are available from the authors upon request.) 13 Our approach is closely related to that used in the labor literature for decomposing changes in the distribution of individual outcomes such as wages. For an example see Juhn et al. (1993) . However, because of the dynamic aspect of our problem, certain new issues arise. 1960 1978 1998 1960-1978 1978-1998 1960-1998 
In the above two equations, ε i j denotes the component of growth that is accounted for by unobservable forces, with the distribution of this residual being allowed to change over time.
In such a framework, changes in the distribution of y 98 relative to y 60 come through the two growth rate equations. Given the reference date of 1978, an interesting question to pose is: what had changed in the period 1978-1998 versus 1960-1978 to bring about a distribution which is bimodal and which has a wider interquartile range? This change between periods can be allocated to four sources: (i) changes in the distribution of the driving variables (that is, changes in the distribution of the X's and y 0 between 1960-1978 and 1978-1998) , (ii) changes in the magnitudes of the ␤'s, (iii) changes in the distribution of unobservable forces, and (iv) a residual category which corresponds to the continuation of the (minor) dynamic process observed over the 1960-1978 period. In light of this decomposition, we can easily build counterfactual income distributions for 1998 which control for one or more of these different effects.
As an example of this approach, consider evaluating the effects due to changes in the distribution of the X's. To do this, we can construct a counterfactual growth rate for the second period, say g i X , which uses the distribution of X's observed over the first period (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) to replace the actual X's observed in the second period. This counterfactual growth rate is then given by
where we are focusing on the bold variable. Using the definition of the rate of growth, we can build a counterfactual distribution of y i 98 , denoted y i X as follows:
Likewise, the effects of changes in the magnitude of the ␤ x on the distribution of income can be measured by constructing the rate of growth, g i ␤ x , that controls for changes in ␤ x :
Similar calculations to those for the system (5) yield
In the same fashion, changes in the distribution of the y 0 's, in the speed of convergence, or in the distribution of unobservables can be accounted for by computing the appropriate rates of growth ( g i y 0 , g i ␤ y , and g i ε respectively) and the implied counterfactual income distributions ( y i y 0 , y i ␤ y , and y i ε ). 14,15 Each of these counterfactual y distributions can be used to give an account of what the distribution of income would have been (in a partial equilibrium sense) if one of the components had remained constant over the two periods. It should be noted that-because of the dynamic aspect of our problem-even if we simultaneously take into account the effects of changes in the distribution of X's, changes in the ␤'s, and changes in the distribution of the ε's, the resulting counterfactual will not mechanically reproduce the distribution of either 1960 or 1978. Instead, the distribution that arises when we consider all three of these effects simultaneously, which we will denote as y R , corresponds to an outcome resulting from projecting to 1998 the dynamic process observed between 1960 and 1978, that is, y i R ϭ y i 78 ϩ 20 g i 60-78 . Hence, when we evaluate our counterfactuals, it is interesting to compare them with the 1960 and 1978 distributions as well as the distribution of y R . 16 14 Note that if we want to account for changes in both the distribution and the coefficients at the same time, we cannot simply add up terms, as there exists an interaction between changes in the coefficients and changes in the distribution. For instance, a measure of the effect of an overall change in the driving forces of the growth process (other than convergence) is obtained by building the variable y i X␤ ϭ y i 98 ϩ 20 ϫ (X i 60-78 ␤ x 60-78 Ϫ X i 78-98 ␤ 78-98 ). 15 Our approach to decomposing a distribution implicitly assumes that the data satisfy the requirement of a pure location model, that is, a mean shift in an X-variable is assumed to shift the distribution but not change its shape. Alternatively, we could adopt a less restrictive framework as made possible by quantile regression techniques. However, a preliminary exploration along this front did not reveal any additional insights, and therefore we did not pursue this line. 16 If we wanted to follow the labor literature more closely, it would be reasonable to build all our counterfactuals starting from the distribution of y R . We chose not to do so, because it renders our analysis less transparent. Nonetheless, we have explored this alternative, and it produces identical insights. Obviously, in order to implement the above decomposition, it is necessary to choose an appropriate set of X's. Our approach to this issue will be to focus on the forces emphasized in neoclassical growth theory (see Solow, 1956 ) as well as other possibilities such as effects of education, institutions, and nonlinear dependence on initial conditions.
IV. Understanding the Growth of Output per Worker
In order to implement the above decomposition, the first step is to examine the stability of the growth process over the period 1960-1978 versus 1978-1998 . If there were stability (that is, the ␤ vector did not change between periods), then the answer to why the distribution changed would have to lie in changes in the distribution of either observed or unobserved factors. In this section, we report a set of cross-country regressions relating growth in output per worker to the initial level of output per worker and other X-variables for both periods 1960-1978 and 1978-1998 . As discussed above, we begin by focusing on the case with only two X-variables [(i) the investment rate and (ii) the rate of population growth], because this will allow us to highlight what we believe to be the major change in the growth process over this period. 17 Afterward, we will show how the change in importance of these two factors is robust to the inclusion of other variables, and especially to controlling for human capital accumulation in different forms. Table 3 reports a series of estimates of the regression of average yearly growth in output per worker on the initial log level of output per worker, the average yearly labor force growth, and the log of the average rate of investment. Estimates are reported for both the periods 1960-1978 and 1978-1998 , and are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS), weighted least squares (WLS), and instrumental variables (IV). Averages for both the regressors and regressants are taken over the respective subsamples.
A. The Rise in Importance of Accumulation Forces
Let us first focus on the OLS results. The convergence parameter-the coefficient associated with y 0 -is close to that reported by other studies (see, for example, Mankiw, Romer, Weil, 1992) . Moreover, the estimates of this effect are quite stable over the two subperiods. Indeed, the stability test of this parameter, which we denote by Q( y 0 ) in the table, does not indicate a rejection of stability at conventional levels ( p ϭ 0.855). 18 In contrast, the magnitude of the estimated coefficients related to the rate of growth of the labor force and the investment/output ratio increase quite substantially between the two subperiods. In the first subperiod (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) , the coefficient measuring the effect of population growth on the growth process is not significant at the conventional 5% level and amounts to Ϫ0.137, implying that a negative 1% differential in population growth would have translated into a positive differential in output per worker of approximately 2.5% over the 18-year period. In the second subperiod, this coefficient rises to Ϫ0.606, implying the same negative 1% differential in the rate of growth would have translated into a positive differential in output per worker of approximately 12%. A somewhat similar pattern is found in the behavior of the coefficient affecting the investment/output ratio. Over the first subperiod, the coefficient affecting investment is 0.016 and significant. Over the second subperiod, this coefficient rises to 0.027. The test statistic Q(n, i/y), which tests the joint null hypothesis of stability in these two parameters across subperiods, decisively rejects stability ( p ϭ 0.002). The restriction of the overall stability of all three coefficients (not including the constant), which is given by Q(total), is also clearly rejected, which opens the door to the possibility that changes in coefficients affecting the growth process is a potential candidate for understanding changes in the distribution documented in section II.
At this point, it is relevant to ask whether OLS estimates may be dominated by the experiences of a subset of small countries. To address this issue, we implement a WLS estimator in which countries are weighted according to their total (log) population. A comparison of the first and second set of columns in table 3 reveals a striking similarity in the 17 The data used are those described in section II and in the appendix. 18 Note that all our stability tests are performed allowing for residuals to be correlated within countries over the two samples, and the variances in the two samples are allowed to differ. , 1960-1998 745 OLS and WLS estimates. 19 In particular, the WLS estimates again point to substantial increases in the importance of the population growth and investment effects between the two periods. As with the OLS estimates, the stability test for these two variables leads to strong rejection. The only noticeable exception is found in the stability test of convergence in the WLS estimates, which now indicates that the convergence process may have increased over the two subperiods. This is not too surprising, given that this procedure weights the Chinese and Indian experience more heavily, both of which caught up rapidly over this period. A second concern is the possibility of measurement error in the regressors, with the investment rate being a particular concern. To address this issue, we implement IV estimators using two instruments. The first, IV1, is the initial (log) level of the investment rate in each subperiod. In the second case, IV2, we instrument the investment rate using the country's average saving rate over each subperiod, given by the average of the consumption/output ratio (in log form) over the subperiod. The justification for this instrument stems from the well-known observation that investment and savings rates tend to be highly correlated across countries. Then, if both are measured with error, the instrumenting procedure utilizes variation corresponding to domestically generated investment in generating the coefficient estimates. The estimation results using these IV strategies are reported in the last two columns of table 3. The entries in those columns indicate that the pattern of results is barely affected by the IV procedures. Convergence still displays stability, and the coefficients are extremely close to those obtained using OLS. Furthermore, the stability tests indicate that the effects of investment rates and population growth changed significantly between the two subperiods, as the p-value associated with Q(n, i/y) is essentially 0 for both IV procedures. The only substantial change associated with these IV procedures is a reduction in the coefficient on the investment/output ratio in the 1960-1978 period (from 0.016 with OLS to 0.009 with IV1). This implies a larger increase in the effect of the investment rate across periods using IV.
Finally, in an earlier version of this paper , we investigated the robustness of our results to the choice of 1978 as the date for splitting our sample. In particular, we explored all splitting dates between 1975 and 1983, and in all cases found substantial changes in the magnitude of the population growth and investment rate coefficients in the later sample relative to the earlier sample. Thus, overall, the results indicate that the main pattern we observe in our simple OLS regression is robust to both the estimation method and the splitting year for the sample.
An alternative means of examining the role of accumulation forces, one which is commonly used in the literature, is to gather the effects of the investment rate and of population growth into one summary variable which captures a country's long-run capital intensity. Indeed, from the standard law of motion of capital, one can readily derive a country's long-run capital/output ratio. The log of this ratio, which we will denote by , is given by the following relationship, where ␦ is the rate of depreciation of capital and ␥ is the rate of growth of labor augmenting technological progress:
ͪ .
To construct we followed Mankiw et al. (1992) and set the annual depreciation rate of capital at 3% (␦ ϭ 0.03) and the rate of technological growth of 2% (␥ ϭ 0.02). We checked the robustness of our results against alternative rates of depreciation and found no major differences.
In the first two columns of table 4, we report IV estimates using as a regressor. We instrument using a two-stage procedure, in the first stage of which we regress on the savings rate, the initial level of i/y, and the population growth rate over the first 15 periods of each subsample. 20 We call this instrument set IV*. These IV results indicate that our accumulation variable shares the properties of our previous estimates of the investment rate and population growth. In particular, its size has more than tripled between the two subsamples, shifting from 0.009 to 0.029, and the stability test strongly indicates rejection.
By reducing the number of covariates in this way, we make it easier to consider results within subsamples. In particular, we can now explore whether the observed instability of coefficients is being driven primarily by rich or poor countries. To this end, we report in table 4 results based on splitting the sample of countries along the median level of incomes in 1960. 21 The results in this table indicate small changes in convergence effects, in opposite directions, in the two sets of countries. More interestingly, though, for both sets of countries there has been a significant change in the importance of accumulation forces of magnitude similar to or higher than that observed in the whole sample. Therefore, the observed increase in the importance of traditional accumulation forces appears to have occurred rather uniformly across rich and poor countries.
Together, the results reported in tables 3 through 4 suggest that there may have been a major change in the determinants of growth across NSSA countries, whereby the importance of the two traditional growth factors emphasized in Solow (1956) -(i) the rate of investment in physical capital (or the savings rate) and (ii) population growthincreased by a factor of almost 3 between the pre-and post-1978 periods. In contrast, we find that the speed of convergence has remained rather stable over the period.
Before turning to examining the relevance of these effects in terms of their role in changing distribution of output per worker, we first need to establish their robustness.
B. Beyond Capital Accumulation: Checking Robustness
In this section, we explore the robustness of our results to potential misspecifications and to different means of addressing the potential role of education.
Nonlinear Convergence: One potential source of bias that may explain our previous results is a misspecification error of the convergence process. Implicit in our growth regression is the assumption that the transition dynamics are linear. However, it may be the case that basins of divergence and convergence have emerged over this period.
One simple way of addressing this possibility is to introduce higher-order terms into the initial level of output in our growth equation. This allows the growth process to be different for countries starting from different initial levels. We introduce square and cubic terms in the initial (log) level of output to explore the relevance of this effect. 22 In parallel with our previous results, we report in table 5 estimates using OLS and IV. As can be seen from the table, nonlinear terms are not found to be significant, whatever the subperiod and whatever the estimation method. Accordingly, convergence does not exhibit any significant instability between the two subperiods, while the accumulation forces continue to exhibit this instability. Hence, nonlinear convergence forces do not appear particularly relevant in our data. 23 Education: Up to now, we have focused on whether the importance of physical capital accumulation may have changed over time. However, education, and the broader concept of human capital, is thought by most to be an important contributing factor to growth. For instance, in the theory of endogenous growth, sustained growth is often the result of the accumulation of human capital over time [see 20 We use population growth over the first 15 periods of each subsample as an instrument in order to mitigate problems induced by the mismeasurement of labor force growth. 21 We use the same IV estimator as in the first two columns of the table. 22 For presentation purposes, the initial level of output is normalized by the 1960 U.S. level for this exercise. 23 In the absence of the investment rate and the rate of population growth in the regression, we do find some minor evidence of nonlinearity. Note: Standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets. We instrument using IV*, which consists of the average c/y over the subsample, the initial level of i/y, and the rate of population growth over the first 15 periods of each subsample. 75 observations. The row labeled Wald reports the Wald test of the restriction implicit in the accumulation variable that the coefficient of i/y is the same as that of log[(1 ϩ n)(1 ϩ ␥) Ϫ (1 Ϫ ␦)]. Uzawa (1965) or Lucas (1988) ]. Furthermore, in their influential paper, Mankiw et al. (1992) propose an augmented version of the Solow growth model and argue that including both types of capital-physical and human-enables the neoclassical growth model to fit the data better. This finding has been challenged [see Durlauf and Quah (1999) or Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997) for discussions], but education is clearly a factor the influence of which deserves attention. Thus, we want to examine (i) whether the effects of education have changed over time in a way that could explain the changes in the world income distribution and (ii) whether controlling for educational investment affects our results regarding the change in importance of traditional growth factors.
In table 6 we present results from regressions, including a measure of educational investment constructed as a weighted average of school enrollment for primary, secondary, and tertiary degrees of education, as documented in Barro and Lee (1993) . 24, 25 This measure follows Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997) , who argue in favor of using a broad set of education classes. We report estimates for both OLS and two sets of IV estimators. First, under the heading IV3, we instrument the investment rate and population rate of growth using the instruments in IV*. Under the heading IV4 we also instrument our educational investment variable using number of years of schooling at the beginning of the period as an instrument.
The results in table 6 point to two main conclusions. First of all, the change in importance of the traditional growth factors over the two samples is not at all diminished when we include educational investment in our equation. In fact, the introduction of education actually magnifies these changes slightly. Second, in none of the three cases do we find the importance of educational investment to have increased over the two subsamples. In fact, the estimates suggest that there may have been a decrease. Thus, the results in this table do not support a strong change in the effect of education investment on growth-at least not in the frequency of two decades 26 -even when we attempt to instrument for education to address measurement error concerns.
As an alternative way of examining the role of education, we construct a long-run intensity variable for human capital as we did for physical capital. This variable, which we denote by Ᏼ, is built using educational investment rate data (E) as follows: 27
As for the physical capital accumulation variable, we set ␥ ϩ ␦ ϭ 0.05. Table 7 reports a set of OLS and IV regressions using both and Ᏼ as regressors. The sets of instruments are the set IV* to instrument (under the heading IV3) and then the set labeled IV4, which extends IV* to include the average years of schooling so as to instrument the educational investment. Once again we find that the importance of education has not increased, while the importance of physical investment appears to have increased by at least a factor of 3.
Institutions: Another possible source of bias in our previous results is the omission of controls for institutional differences across countries. Several empirical studies find that factors such as the degree of political stability and the type of political organization likely play a leading role in the growth process (see Hall and Jones, 1999; Rodrik, 1999) . As a first pass at this issue, we include Hall and Jones's social infrastructure (SI) variable, which they argue to be a good summary measure of institutions favorable to development, in our regressions. 28 In the first two columns of table 8, we report estimates for our extended baseline regression, which includes the phys- 24 Note that because of data availability problems, we lose seven countries from our sample. 25 The weights for calculating this measure of educational investment correspond to the average number of years spent in each degree, Educ ϵ log [(6E P ϩ 6E S ϩ 4E T )/16], where E P , E S , and E T denote respectively the enrollment rates in the primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors. 26 This result is in line with that obtained by Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) , who also find an insignificant and wrong-signed effect of education investment on GDP growth. However, it contrasts with the findings of Krueger and Lindhal (2001) , who point to a positive effect of education on output growth. It should nevertheless be noted that the strong positive effect of education on growth obtained by Krueger and Lindhal (2001) only holds when they abstract from physical capital (see their table 1, p. 1112). As soon as physical capital is brought back into the regression, education changes are not significant. 27 The measure of educational investment we use is the same weighted average of enrollment rates as in table 6 . 28 The measure of social infrastructure is formed by combining two indices (equal weights). The first is an index of government antidiversion policies created by Political Risk Services, a firm that specializes in risk assessments to international investors. The second is an index of trade openness compiled by Sachs and Warner (1995) . Note: Standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets. IV3: The set of instruments for i/y and n is IV*, which consists of the average (c/y) over the subsample, the initial level of i/y, and the rate of population growth over the 15 first periods of each subsample. 75 observations. ical and human capital accumulation variables ( and Ᏼ), and Hall and Jones's SI variable. Throughout this table, we instrument for using the instrument set IV*. Two facts should be noted from these first two columns. First, the inclusion of the SI variable does not change our previous observation regarding the increased importance of physical capital accumulation over the period 1978-1998 relative to 1960-1978 . In fact, the inclusion of SI does not change our previous estimates at all. Second, as opposed to the role of physical capital accumulation, we find that the importance of institutions in growth-at least as measured by SI-has not increased over time and may have actually decreased.
In the third and fourth columns of table 8, we instrument the SI variable using the instruments suggested by Hall and Jones, that is, using the distance from the equator, the fraction of the population speaking English at birth, the fraction of the population speaking a Western European language at birth, and the trade share as predicted by Frankel and Romer (1996) . 29 Hall and Jones suggest the desirability of instrumenting the SI variable, in that it may be endogenous to good growth performance. As in the first two columns, we can see from columns 3 and 4 in table 8 that our main results on the role of physical capital are robust to the introduction of SI even after instrumenting. Even after instrumenting, we do not find that the SI variable helps predict growth in either of the subperiods, nor do we find it to affect the coefficients on . 30 In , we verified the robustness of this result by introducing each of the instruments for SI directly in our growth regression. It should be noted that these results do not address the possibility that a change in the importance of institutions may be underlying the increased importance of capital accumulation, even if they are not a proximate cause.
As can be seen from all the preceding experiments, our main findings-(i) a steady convergence and (ii) an increase in the importance of traditional forces of accumulation-are robust to many specification changes and estimation methods. Accordingly, we will use the estimated growth process from our benchmark OLS regression in table 3 in what follows to decompose the changes in the distribution of output per worker. Results related to using other estimates are very similar. 31
V. Implementing the Decomposition
In this section we decompose the observed changes in the distribution of output per worker over the period 1960-1978 using the framework presented in section III. As suggested in the results of the last section, part of the explanation for the observed changes may be due to changes in the importance of the traditional forces of the accumulation processthat is, changes in the ␤'s associated with the rate of investment and population growth. Figure 3 reports the decomposition of changes in the distribution for different potential effects using our benchmark OLS regression as our estimate of the growth process [results using IV estimates are reported in ]. Each panel reports three pieces of information. The gray line corresponds to the initial distribution of output per worker as observed in 1960, the plain dark line corresponds to the 1998 distribution output per worker, and the dashed dark line is the distribution of the 1998 output per worker 29 This variable is actually the (log) trade share of an economy, as predicted from a gravity model of international trade that only uses a country's population and geographical features. 30 The results in columns 3 and 4 of table 8 may appear to conflict with those in Hall and Jones (1999) , which report a positive and significant effect of SI on productivity. It should however be noted that the main reason for that difference is that Hall and Jones (1999) focus on levels and not growth rates. 31 The regression results correspond to all countries in the Penn World Tables apart from those in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). In , we investigate the robustness of our results to the inclusion of the SSA countries. When we estimate the same regressions as in section IV.A using the whole sample, we observe increases in the magnitude of the coefficients associated with the rate of growth of the labor force and the investment rate that are very similar to those in the restricted, NSSA sample. Note: Standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets. IV3: The set of instruments for i/y and n is IV*, which consists of the average (c/y) over the subsample, the initial level of i/y, and the rate of population growth over the first 15 periods of each subsample. IV4: IV* is completed by the years of schooling to also instrument the education variable. 68 observations. "corrected" for the effect that we examine. More precisely, the last distribution is based on each counterfactual experiment described in section III. For example, when we look at the effects of a change in the coefficients of population growth and the investment/output ratio, the distribution we report is that obtained using equation (7).
This counterfactual experiment furnishes an answer to the question: What would the 1998 output per worker distribution have been had the coefficients in the growth process remained at their values from the earlier period? We complement the graphical analysis with reports of the same decompositions reported in terms of the 20-80, 25-75, and 30-70 ͒]. As clearly indicated by the figure, and commensurate with the stability of the convergence parameters in the regression results, changes in the convergence forces do not explain much of the changes in the decomposition, as the counterfactual distribution remains very close to the 1998 distribution. This graphical appraisal is confirmed by the quantitative results reported in table 9. For instance, changes in convergence forces account for 0.065 of the total change in the interquartile range between 1960 and 1998. However, this does not imply a lack of a role for convergence in shaping the distribution. To illustrate this, we report in panel B of figure 3 the distribution that would have obtained had convergence totally vanished over the second subperiod (␤ y 78-98 ϭ 0). As can be seen from the figure, had convergence disappeared, the distribution would have widened substantially, particularly in the tails of the distribution. Thus, we are not arguing that the role of convergence was irrelevant over this period, only that changes in this force do not help to account for the observed widening of the distribution.
We now turn our attention to the accumulation forces embodied in the population growth rate and the investment/ output ratio. We first focus on the effects of the changes in the distributions of those variables. The fact that the counterfactual distribution built using equation (5) and displayed in panel C is close to the actual 1998 distribution implies that changes in the distributions of the accumulation forces explain little of the changes in the overall distribution. This result is unsurprising given figure 4, which reports the 1960-1978 and 1978-1998 distributions of the investment/ output ratio and the population rate of growth. The distributions of these variables remain rather stable across the two subperiods, with the distribution of the investment rate becoming-if anything-more peaked in the second period. Thus, changes in their distributions cannot explain an overall expanding distribution. This graphical appraisal is confirmed by the inspection of the ⌬X n,i/y column in table 9, which indicates, for instance, that changes in the distribution of traditional accumulation forces account for only a 0.035 change in the interquartile range.
Hence if the explanation of the change in the distributions is to be found in the forces associated with physical capital Note: Standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets. IV3: The set of instruments for i/y and n is IV*, which consists of the average (c/y) over the subsample, the initial level of i/y, and the rate of population growth over the 15 first periods of each subsample. IV4: IV* is completed by the years of schooling to also instrument the education variable. 68 observations. The instrument for is IV*, which consists of the average (c/y) over the subsample, the initial level of i/y, and the rate of population growth over the first 15 periods of each subsample. IV5: The instruments for SI are the distance from the equator, the fraction of the population speaking English at birth, the fraction of the population speaking a Western European language at birth, and the FrankelRomer instrument described in Hall and Jones (1999) . There are 64 observations. accumulation, it should be found in a variation in the coefficients. This case is examined in panel D of figure 3 with the counterfactual experiment based on equation (7). The figure shows that changes in the coefficients affecting population growth and the investment/output ratio contribute a great deal to the phenomenon. Correcting for the instability in the accumulation coefficients completely undoes the twin-peaks phenomenon. Beyond the effects in terms of bimodality, setting the coefficients to their 1960-1978 values generates a more compressed counterfactual distribution, indicating that the large change in these coefficients between periods contributed to the widening of the distribution.
The qualitative appraisal based on the figures is confirmed by the results in the ␤ n,i/y column of table 9. For example, out of the 0.265 change in the interquartile range that took place between 1960 and 1998, the change in the coefficients of the two accumulation forces account for 0.264. The same pattern is found for the 20-80 percentile difference, as a change of 0.194 is predicted by the instability of the coefficients, to be compared with the 0.207 found in the data. To reiterate, the changes in the magnitude of the accumulation forces appear to have contributed enormously to the observed changes in the shape of the distribution. Overall, changes in the accumulation forces, that is, effects due to both changes in the coefficients and changes in the distributions of i/y and n, actually slightly overexplain the observed modification in the shape of the distribution of output per worker. This is shown in column 7 (under Obs. n,i/y ) in table 9 and in panel E of figure 3. However, when we examine results in terms of changes between 1978 and 1998, the accumulation forces explain the observed change almost exactly. For example, out of the observed change 0.376 in the interquartile range between 1978 and 1998, the changes due to the total of accumulation forces (both ␤ and the distribution of X's) is 0.305.
The final element in our decomposition consists of the residual or unobserved factors. Panel F of figure 3 indicates that omitted or residual factors did not play a very decisive role in this process. Indeed, as can be seen from the figure, controlling for unobservable components leaves the distribution of 1998 output per worker almost unchanged. This finding is confirmed by the last column of table 9, which indicates that the contribution of unobservable components to the explanation of the changes in the percentile differences is much lower than the contribution due to changes in the importance of population growth and the investment rate. This observation is especially surprising given that, by adopting a very parsimonious specification of the growth process, we could have expected the residual component to play a large role.
Our approach in table 9 has been to present the effects of different forces (␤'s, X's, unobservables, and so on) one at a time-altering only one component while leaving the others at their 1978-1998 values. This approach has the attractive property of treating each force symmetrically. However, a more common means of reporting results of decompositions is to combine effects sequentially so that the end results mechanically add up to explain the relevant change in the distribution. In , we report results from this type of adding-up decomposition. We show that regardless of the ordering in which we add components, changes in the coefficients on n and i/y explain most of the hollowing-out process as captured by our reference percentile differences.
In light of all the preceding results, we infer that most of the observed changes in the distribution of output per worker between 1960 (or 1978) and 1998-in particular, its widening in the interquartile range area and the twin-peaks phenomenon-is related to an increase in importance of traditional accumulation forces. More particularly, this change resulted from a change in the form of the process (coefficients) rather than a modification in the distribution of these forces. 32
VI. Concluding Remarks
The object of this paper has been to shed light on the relative importance of different factors in reshaping the world distribution of output per worker between 1960 and 1998. Our main finding is that most of the change in distribution observed since 1978 is driven by changes in the importance of the two factors associated with capital deepening-the investment rate (or saving rate), and the rate of labor force growth. We take these results as suggesting new directions for research aimed at understanding differences in economic performance across countries since 1960. In particular, we think that such research should investigate the reasons for the substantive increase in the social returns to capital accumulation we document in the period 1978-1998 relative to 1960-1978. 33 We believe that it is only by explaining these changes that one can understand why certain countries did so much better than others over this period. 32 When we add the sub-Saharan African countries to our sample, we find that one can account for the changes in the world income distribution from 1960 to 1998 with a combination of two factors: (i) the bad residual draws experienced by SSA countries before 1978, and (ii) a dramatic change in the importance of traditional factors affecting growth after 1978 for all countries.
33 At a first pass, it may be thought that an increase in the speed of embodied technological change could easily explain the observed pattern. However, at closer inspection this is not the case. For example, in the presence of faster embodied technological change it can be easily verified that the effect of population growth on output should become smaller, not bigger. 
